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IoT devices are known for long-lived hardware and short-lived software support by the
vendor, which sets the wrong security incentives for users of expensive IoT systems. In order
to mitigate as many known vulnerabilities as possible after the vendor has stopped providing
security patches for an IoT device, we present a framework that allows the user to selectively
disable single hardware components which provide non-essential features that are associated
with said vulnerabilites. In the same way, the framework can also be used proactively to
reduce the attack surface of an IoT device by disabling unused features. The user’s selection
is enforced by a trusted computing base using different hardware security mechanisms on
the ARM platform. To this end, we analyze the common hardware architecture of embedded
ARM systems using the example of the Raspberry Pi 4. We conclude that only virtualization
provides a fine-grained enough partition capabilities for the purpose of partitioning the
hardware into used and unused components. However, we also show how other security
mechanisms including IOMMUs and ARM TrustZone could be used as an optimization in
some cases.
Finally, we give a proof of concept implementation using the Raspberry Pi 4 and the
Sense HAT as a simulation of a complex IoT device and show how 6 of its hardware




The Internet of Things (IoT) has seen a rapid gain in popularity in recent years, both among
consumers but also in industrial settings. No computing environment seems to be able to
escape the pervasiveness of IoT devices. At the same time, the constantly increasing number
of deployed IoT devices has produced new security and privacy challenges on a new scale.
Due to the connected nature of these devices, the security implications are not limited to the
device itself but can affect other parts of the internet. For example, the Mirai botnet abused
more than 145,000 devices to launch a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack with a
volume of 1Tbps [1]. One of the key contributors allowing large scale attacks like the Mirai
botnet is the wide-spread use of outdated software with known vulnerabilities among IoT
devices. This also becomes apparent by a difference in the lifespan of the hardware and
software used in IoT devices. Although the lifespan of IoT hardware is estimated by some
vendors to be more than 10 years [2], as a user it is more reasonable to expect software
updates, including critical security patches for only a few years. This is also confirmed by a
2020 survey of IoT devices, in which the researchers found that 83% of medical imaging
devices were using software that is no longer maintained [3]. After a vendor drops software
support for a device, it is merely a matter of time until vulnerabilities are discovered in
device drivers, the operating system powering the IoT device or the application layer. For
this reason, a long-lasting security integration in the entire life-cycle of IoT devices is
integral. This has also caused governments of several countries to push for new IoT security
regulations [4, 5]. For example, the State of California’s Senate Bill 327 can be summarized
as requiring ’reasonable security feature or features that are appropriate to the nature and
function of the device’ [6].
1
1.1 Problem Description
Specifically, for this thesis we want to focus on more expensive and powerful, long-lived
IoT devices. While there is already a large share of cheaper IoT devices being operated
with unmaintained software, in case of more pricey devices there are additional economic
incentives to keep operating potentially vulnerable devices as opposed to buying a newer
model. Typical examples would include smart fridges and other home appliances equipped
with smart features. Since such vulnerability-prone IoT devices are unlikely to receive
security patches after a few years, alternative methods aiming at reducing the risk and
containing the threat posed by the operation of vulnerable IoT devices must be explored.
1.2 Goal
The main idea we explore in this thesis is that users could still prevent exploitation of
unpatched vulnerabilities by deactivating and not using those hardware components asso-
ciated with vulnerabilities. On one hand, this includes hardware components whose driver,
or the kernel subsystem directly interacting with the driver, contain vulnerabilities. On the
other hand, hardware components associated with vulnerabilities include those components
subject to exploitation because of faulty application-level logic.
For instance, a smart fridge may be comprised of numerous components such as [7]:
• Touch display
• Cameras inside the fridge or freezer
• Compressor and other components of the cooling cycle
• Ice maker and dispenser
• Speaker, potentially microphone
• Hardware accelerators for multimedia
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• External storage device interfaces such as USB or SD card readers for updating and
customization purposes
• Networking interfaces including WiFi, Bluetooth and potentially ethernet
A subset of these components, in this example the last three, is directly wired on the
main board, whereas other components are connected to it via some peripheral interface or
bus. Although some of these components are essential for the main function of the fridge,
other components, which can be on chip or some peripheral device, could be deactivated
to mitigate a vulnerability. For example, if the driver for hardware accelerated multimedia
decoding is vulnerable to remote code execution via an attacker controlled input, it would
suffice to deactivate only the hardware acceleration chip, and thereby its driver, instead of
replacing the entire fridge.
We envision this method being used in two scenarios. First, the user could proactively
disable hardware components that provide features the user does not want to use in order to
reduce the overall attack surface of an IoT device. Second, the user could retroactively dis-
able hardware components which are associated with vulnerabilities to prevent exploitation
or at least limit the amount of damage that attackers could cause.
The goal is therefore to entirely prevent the operating system (OS) from accessing those
deactivated devices using a hardware abstraction layer (HAL) acting as a trusted computing
base (TCB) for securely managing hardware components. The configuration should be
controllable via a configuration interface that is part of the TCB. The TCB should then
enforce the access restrictions for hardware components as defined by the user so that no
software, including the operating system, can access it. Since a large share of IoT devices is
powered by the ARM platform, our discussion and conclusions will be based on the ARM
architecture and security mechanisms.
3
1.3 Assumptions & Threat Model
Given our initial goal, the work presented in this thesis is based on several assumptions for
IoT devices on which the TCB may be deployed:
Remote Attacker. Attackers do not have physical access to the IoT device. Instead, they
may be able to communicate with the IoT device via any networking interface from
within the local network or via the internet. This includes the ability to craft arbitrary
network traffic.
The OS cannot be trusted. Most operating systems are complex and large. Under the con-
ditions given in our problem description, especially in the scenario of retroactively
deactivating hardware components, we must assume that the IoT device’s software
might already be compromised. Since the OS could be affected as well, a self policing
approach does not satisfy our security requirements (see section 1.4).
All boot programs are trusted. All bootloader stages, as well as firmware or other software
executing before the first operating system is booted, only perform device initializa-
tion and do not use hardware components or perform any other actions that could be
exploited by remote attackers.
Static hardware. The hardware configuration of the IoT system does not change, and we
therefore have perfect and complete knowledge of all hardware components present
and controllable by the operating system. This includes hardware devices which are
dynamically discoverable and hot-swappable. That means, a dynamically discovered
hardware component is always assigned the same address on the respective bus.
Correct user behavior. The user uses the configuration interface as intended. In scenarios
where the user interacts with the configuration application via the same hardware,
the user correctly identifies based on some indicator that they are using the TCB’s
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configuration interface as opposed to the guest mimicking the interface in order to
prevent the user from disabling devices.
1.4 Security Properties
In addition to our assumptions and the functional goals, we also have several security require-
ments for a TCB managing hardware resources. The requirements can mostly be derived
from those of a trusted computing base:
Tamper Proof The operating system or application layer cannot enable or disable devices
at will. This includes the current system configuration as well as the configuration
application controlling what devices will be accessible to the OS. The TCB must also
make sure that the operating system cannot modify boot programs.
Complete Mediation It is impossible for the operating system or applications running on
top of it to access hardware components that should be inaccessible per the user’s
configuration. To this end, all hardware resources must be strictly controlled by the
TCB, most importantly the physical address space, including memory mapped I/O
(MMIO) regions, and interrupts.
Correctness The TCB should not contain vulnerabilities or logic bugs allowing the operat-
ing system or applications to access devices. Generally, this means the TCB should be
as small and contain as little complexity as possible, thereby minimizing the chance
of bugs.
Availability / No Interference The operating system or applications are not able to block
the TCB from operating or prevent the user from disabling a hardware component,




Restricting the OS access to hardware components seems like a simple goal, however
its realization can be quite challenging. By far the biggest challenge is ensuring that the
deactivated components can indeed not be accessed by the operating system. This essentially
requires us to partition the IoT device components into those usable by the operating system
and application, those controlled by the TCB and those which are disabled. As we will
show in our analysis chapter, due to the internal complexity of IoT devices a hypervisor
based TCB using virtualization to restrict access to selected hardware components cannot
be avoided using current hardware components. This means that known input/output (I/O)
device virtualization challenges have to be overcome. This is exacerbated by the fact that
not all devices are accessed in the same way via a common bus. Instead, the components on
a system may be spread over multiple bus systems each with their own characteristics and
security properties which we have to consider. As a result, there is no single silver bullet
strategy for making sure that the operating system has only access to enabled devices.
Because the hardware components must be split into the TCB and OS or application
domain, it is possible that both domains require access to the same hardware components.
Therefore, in order to design a IoT device using selective deactivation, the relationships
between hardware components (dependencies) must also be considered.
1.6 Thesis Overview
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: in the next chapter we first introduce
some basic concepts and background information required to better understand the chal-
lenges and our proposed framework. This includes a broad overview of the architecture
of ARM based systems, security mechanisms on the ARM platform, device virtualization
techniques as well as a primer on device discovery in the Linux kernel using the device
tree. Specific examples are given based on the Raspberry Pi 4 not only in this chapter but
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throughout this entire thesis, since it served as our development device.
In chapter 3, we analyze the facts presented in our background chapter with regard
to our goals and security requirements. More specifically, we analyze dependencies in
hardware components using the device tree and how they translate into requirements or
restrictions with regard to devices which the user might want to disable. This analysis shows
that virtualization is required to partition the hardware into multiple domains. Further, our
analysis is helpful for implementing the framework for specific IoT devices in order to
combine device virtualization methods, which allows to optimize the implementation for
the smallest possible TCB.
This is followed by a description of our proposed framework in chapter 4. While we
acknowledge the usefulness of TrustZone technology for restricting access to controllers on
the system on a chip (SoC) or single board computer (SBC), we focus on using virtualization
for enforcing disabled devices in this thesis. In addition, we present our implementation of
the framework and discuss our case study based on the Raspberry Pi 4 in chapter 5. Finally,




In order to get a better understanding of how the stated goals can be achieved, we need to
understand a number of mechanisms first. Keeping practicality in mind, we will focus on
Linux systems on the ARM platform. In this chapter we describe the required background
knowledge on which we will base our proposed framework, which includes the ARM system
architecture, hardware assisted security mechanisms and the device tree. To this end we use
the device tree of the Raspberry Pi 4 and its visualization as examples. Both are attached to
this thesis in the appendix, see figures A.1 and A.2. Lastly, we give a short analysis of these
concepts and how they relate to our goals.
2.1 Platform Architecture
A typical ARM hardware system architecture which we consider for this thesis is shown in
figure 2.1. Here, the central processing unit (CPU) connects to other controllers residing on
the SoC using a system interconnect, which is usually based on the Advanced Microcon-
troller Bus Architecture (AMBA) on ARM systems. Additional peripheral controllers can
be added on the board hosting the SoC. These peripherals are connected to the peripheral
interconnect, a separate bus for controllers on the SBC utside the SoC, which is connected
to the system interconnect via a bridge controller. From the CPU’s point of view, as well
as that of other board components, the partition into the system and peripheral interconnect
is hidden and requires no extra software configuration. Next to the generic interconnects,
there can also be direct connections between controllers. External peripherals and circuits
may be connected to the system via any peripheral interface supported by one of the con-
trollers on the board. For example, the Raspberry Pi 4 can connect to external peripherals























Figure 2.1: Typical ARM single board computer block schematic.
asynchronous receiver/transmitter (UART) on general purpose I/O (GPIO) pins. For our
purposes of enabling or disabling devices, we will consider all controllers on the SoC, the
rest of the SBC and external systems connected via one of the peripheral controllers.
2.2 Hardware Assisted Security Mechanisms
2.2.1 ARM Virtualization Extensions
ARM’s hardware virtualization support provides separation and virtualization mechanisms
for both memory and interrupts [8]. Switching execution between different virtual machines
(VMs) is supported by an additional execution mode, execution level (EL) 2 or hyp mode,
in which the hypervisor executes. Similar to hardware virtualization on other platforms, the
memory management unit (MMU) must support a second address translation stage in order
to translate from guest physical addresses to machine physical addresses. By selecting which
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address ranges are mapped into the guest physical address space, the MMU can control
which memory regions and devices the VM can access. This allows memory partition with
page granularity, but even more fine-grained access restrictions for VMs can be achieved
using the trap and emulate method.
Further, interrupts are masked and virtualized using the Generic Interrupt Controller
(GIC), which provides two separate interfaces for CPUs and virtual CPUs [9]. The hypervi-
sor only has to assign and mask a virtual GIC (vGIC) to each virtual machine once. Then,
each VM can directly handle interrupts without any need for emulation by the hypervisor.
2.2.2 ARM TrustZone
ARM TrustZone is a trusted execution environment for the ARM platform which divides
the system into two worlds, a secure and a non-secure world [10, 11]. The more powerful
TrustZone variant designed for the ARM v8-A instruction set architecture uses an additional
privileged execution mode, EL3, to manage the two worlds and world switches in the secure
monitor. This means that TrustZone operates orthogonally to existing hardware virtual-
ization support and does not preclude usage of the latter, as show in figure 2.2. However,
hypervisors in the secure world can only be used as of ARM v8.4-A and newer [9]. The
isolation of the two worlds is achieved in hardware by introducing an additional address
bit on the system interconnect, indicating which world a transaction is part of. As a result,
controllers connected to the system or peripheral interconnect are also partitioned into the
two worlds, with the option of sharing a controller between both worlds if supported by
the controller. Further, TrustZone also facilitates the GIC and vGIC interfaces to deliver
interrupts to both worlds separately without software-side emulation. The partition into the
two TrustZone worlds is only possible on a per-device granularity.
In addition to its intended use as a trusted execution environment, TrustZone can even
be used for virtualization purposes in different setups as shown by Pinto and Santos [11].
10
Secure Monitor















Figure 2.2: ARM TrustZone architecture [8, 9, 10]. A trusted hypervisor is only possible in
ARM v8.4-A and newer.
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2.2.3 IOMMU / SMMU
The I/O memory management unit (IOMMU), called System Memory Management Unit
(SMMU) on ARM, is the analog to the MMU for I/O devices. It allows the hypervisor to
give a VM full control of a peripheral controller and its MMIO registers [12], even in the
absence of TrustZone. In addition, with an SMMU the partitioning guarantees given by
TrustZone or virtualization can be extended to peripheral devices thar are neither connected
to the system nor the peripheral interconnect.
Although a passthrough assignment to a virtual machine is possible without an SMMU
if the device’s registers are identity-mapped into the guest physical space (guest physical
address = machine physical address), this setup is susceptible to direct memory access
(DMA) attacks [13]. In this scenario, a rouge VM could abuse the device’s DMA capabilities
to read or even manipulate memory regions which are not mapped into the VM’s address
space. This means the VM could manipulate the hypervisor’s memory or interact with
registers of devices which should be inaccessible.
As shown in figure 2.1, the SMMU mediates between the system interconnect and
client devices, in this example a single Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) controller.
Controlled by the hypervisor, the SMMU performs the second stage address translation from
the guest physical address space to machine physical address space for DMA transactions,
which means that VMs can now directly control client I/O devices connected via an SMMU
[12]. Similar to the configuration of the MMU, the hypervisor can control which memory
regions can be accessed by clients by mapping memory regions into a separate I/O virtual
address space (IOVA). In the case of older SMMU models, one SMMU is required for each
client, but newer models support multiple devices at a time. Since each transaction from a
client device is tagged with a unique identifier, clients can be operated in separate IOVAs
for isolation purposes, as well as in joint IOVAs to facilitate communication within subsets
of the client devices.
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2.3 I/O Device Virtualization Strategies
2.3.1 Passthrough Assignment
With the passthrough assignment, a virtual machine obtains direct control of a passed-
through device, including its memory-mapped registers and its interrupts. This method
introduces no complexity whatsoever, other than correct configuration of the MMU and the
interrupt controller. The VM gains complete controle over the device. As we have already
mentioned in section 2.2.3, a passthrough assignment of a device that can initiate DMA
transactions allows a rogue VM to launch DMA attacks, which could allow it to bypass
virtualization restrictions and manipulate the hypervisor.
2.3.2 Full Virtualization
A fully virtualized device is emulated for the guest at the register level. The advantage of
this approach is that the VM’s operating system does not need to be modified in order to be
able to operate the emulated device.
A typical implementation for a full virtualization driver of a physical device is the trap
and emulate approach, which simply forwards all register accesses to the physical device,
thereby acting as a proxy for each register access by VM. For example, this method can
be used as an alternative to an SMMU in order to prevent DMA attacks for devices with
simple register interfaces. In case of the ethernet controller in the Raspberry Pi 4, DMA
transactions are controlled by the driver by writing the buffer address and size two device
registers before the transaction is started 1. Here, access to DMA address registers could be
mediated by the hypervisor to prevent otherwise illegal memory accesses.




Paravirtualization emulates a physical device on top of the HAL interface, thereby abstract-
ing away the characteristics of the concrete device that is emulated. However, the OS running
in the virtual machine requires a special paravirtualization driver, called the frontend driver,
in order to interact with its paravirtualization counterpart in the hypervisor, the backend
driver. For this thesis, we will consider paravirtualization drivers to be implemented on top
of the hypervisor’s hardware abstraction layer.
Compared to full virtualization, the advantage of paravirtualization is the possibility
of reusing the paravirtualization driver, since it only needs to be implemented once for an
entire class of devices, as opposed to full virtualization which must be reimplemented for
each concrete device.
2.4 Device Tree
Unlike the x86 architecture, where the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI)
is the industry standard for dynamic device discovery at runtime, the most common method
for enumerating hardware devices in an ARM-based embedded system is the device tree
(DT).
The device tree is a static description of a system’s hardware components and resources,
as well as how they relate to each other. As the name suggests, the tree represents each
hardware component as a node in a hierarchical tree structure (see the DT for the Raspberry
Pi 4 as an example in figure A.1 in the appendix). Each node in the tree stands for:
• a bus or bus controller, which is usually a branch node. Buses providing their own
device discovery or probing mechanism, like PCI controllers, can be leaf nodes.
Each bus creates its own address space in which its child nodes can be addressed.
simple-bus nodes are special platform internal I/O buses that do not support de-
vice probing and do not require any other configuration or software support in order
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to access the devices represented by their child nodes.
• a hardware chip, mostly leaf nodes in the tree, providing a certain functionality.
• a more fine-grained resource, such as a single GPIO pin. This can also include
somewhat abstract resources such as a power domain node, which describes in what
groups hardware components can be powered on or off.
The root node is a special node representing the physical address space.
Further, each node contains key-value properties describing the device that is repre-
sented. Internally represented by a bytestring, on a higher level all values can consist of a
combination of unsigned 32 or 64 bit integers, strings, bytestrings or references to other
nodes. There exists a set of properties specified in the DT specification [15], however all
other properties have device-specific interpretation and meaning. The most important prop-
erties include:
• compatible, a list of strings each identifying a compatible device driver.
• reg, a list of regions in the parent’s address space where the device’s registers are
mapped.
• interrupts, a list of interrupt specifiers describing which interrupts the device
may raise. In the simplest case, the specifier is the hardware interrupt number.
• ranges, which maps portions of the address space created by a bus into its parent’s
address space, effectively making it accessible to every other device on or with access
to the parent’s bus.
• phandle, a unique numerical identifier meant for referencing a node. For further
description of this feature, see the analysis on device dependencies in section 3.2.
Since the root node represents the physical address space on a system, this means that
each of the root node’s child nodes with a reg property represents a MMIO device. Using
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the ranges property, even devices which are not direct children of the root node can be
memory mapped. For example, all child nodes of /soc and /scb in the Raspberry Pi 4
device tree (see figure A.1) are also memory mapped if they have a reg property.
Properties can also contain references to other nodes in order to describe how devices
interact with each other. A node is uniquely identifiable via its path in the device tree or
using its phandle.
2.4.1 Device Tree Usage
Once compiled from its source code representation as shown in figure A.1, which is called
the device tree source (DTS), the resulting device tree blob (DTB) is installed on the boot
medium to make it accessible to the system’s firmware, bootloader and hypervisor [15].
During the compilation, all properties are packed from their higher level representation
(strings, bytestrings, unsigned integers, references) into a byte sequence of variable length.
At each stage in the boot process, the boot program can initialize hardware devices and
make changes to the device tree as required, including adding, modifying or removing nodes.
For example, the firmware of the Raspberry Pi 4 adds a property to the ethernet controller
describing the controller’s MAC address. The modified device tree is then transferred to the
next stage in the boot process, along with the control flow. At last, a reference to the device
tree is passed to Linux when it is started, which then uses the DTB as the single source of
truth about the hardware components on the system and uses it to determine and load the
appropriate driver for each device. In turn, each device driver instance uses the properties
of the representing node for its own configuration. Device nodes may also be added or
reconfigured at runtime by applying overlays on top of the tree. Further, bus controllers with
integrated probing or device discovery functionality may dynamically load device drivers




Based on the concepts and systems described in the previous chapter, we further clarify the
consequences of our goals and security requirements in this section. Further, we introduce
new concepts we deem to be helpful in better understanding of the relationships between
hardware components. This analysis is equally valuable for our framework design and later
on for the implementation of the framework for a particular IoT device in order to make the
right design decisions for the smallest possible TCB.
3.1 What Devices To Disable
At first, it is important to specify the hardware components for which deactivation makes
sense. Reusing our example from the introduction, this may include both on-chip as well as
external peripheral components.
Therefore, it is desirable to be able to deactivate all peripheral interfaces connected to
external peripherals that are non-essential to the IoT system’s functionality. In addition,
some interfaces allow multiple peripherals to be connected to the same peripheral controller,
for example PCI, I2C or SPI. In these cases, blocking access to a single connected peripheral,
that is, its address on the peripheral bus, is preferred over disabling the entire peripheral
controller. Not all peripherals connected via a peripheral controller are manifested in the
device tree, since the device tree only contains devices that are controlled by a kernel driver.
As a result, peripheral controllers or their child nodes are usually leaf nodes in the device
tree.
In addition, some hardware components on the SBC may be candidates for deactiva-
tion as well, as long as they provide non-essential functions. For example, the multimedia
accelerators or WiFi chip components could be considered on-chip components for which
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deactivation is desired. Again, these are typically leaf nodes in the device tree. Even more,
the dependency analysis in the following section will show that these devices do not even
have incoming dependency edges in the dependency graph. As a matter of fact, the WiFi
controller in the Raspberry Pi 4 is not even part of the device tree because it is connected via
the Secure Digital Input Output (SDIO) bus controlled by /soc/mmcnr@7e3000001.
For the remainder of this thesis, we will consider all components fulfilling either of these
two criteria to be devices for which deactivation should be supported.
3.2 Device Dependencies
Most components in a system will no be operable on their own, but require the services
provided by other controllers in order to be usable by software. In case of our example device
tree of the Raspberry Pi 4, the MultiMedia Card (MMC) controller/soc/mmc@7e300000
relies on the DMA controller /soc/dma@7e00700 in order to read the contents from the
inserted micro SD card into a memory buffer or vice versa. For every hardware component
that we want to use, we need to make sure that all other devices required by such relation-
ships are also enabled and usable. Or, put in other words, we need to perform a dependency
analysis on the device tree to satisfy the dependencies of all enabled devices.
For this thesis, we will consider each reference in the device tree to be a dependency
of the referencing node, called consumer, on the referenced node, called provider. Some
references also include a specifier which details exactly which resource is consumed by the
device. This is required for providers which manage multiple resources of the same kind,
such as interrupt controllers, GPIO controllers and clock providers. For instance, the device
/soc/i2s@7e203000 consumes the output clock BCM2835 CLOCK PCM (the macro
resolves to clock number 31) of the clock provider cprman, as well as DMA channels 2
and 3 of the SoC’s DMA controller. In addition to dependencies mentioned explicitly in
1This can be verified by running the following two commands on a standard installation of Raspbian on
the Raspberry Pi 4 (brcmfmac it the name of the WiFi driver):
ls -la /sys/class/mmc host/mmc1/
ls -la /sys/class/mmc host/mmc1/mmc1\:0001/mmc1\:0001\:{1,2}/
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properties, we also consider two other sources of dependencies.
3.2.1 Parent-Child Relationship
Firstly, each device in the device tree depends on its parent node, since the OS can only
communicate with devices via the controller of the bus on which said child is addressed. One
exception is the root node representing physical address space, which is directly accessible
by the CPU. Also, some bus nodes do not represent an actual bus controller and map the
entire address space created by the latter into their parent address space. For example, the
/soc and /scb nodes in the device tree of the Raspberry Pi 4 (see figure A.1), such as
all other buses with compatible string simple-bus, represent platform internal I/O buses
on which child nodes can be accessed without any additional configuration. In these cases,
the child-parent dependency can be disregarded, however there is no automated method
known to the author to reliably determine whether or not a bus controller is required in order
to access its child devices in the device tree. This information would therefore need to be
encoded in the device tree.
3.2.2 Interrupt Dependencies
Secondly, each device depends on the interrupt controller serving any of its raised interrupt
requests. Even though interrupts are declared as specifiers, they do not include an explicit
reference to the handling interrupt controller. Instead, interrupt controllers and consuming
devices are organized in interrupt domains, which can be thought of a separate tree that is
orthogonal to the device tree. In order to find the interrupt controller serving an interrupt, we
need to follow the interrupt-parent and interrupt-map properties in the device
tree, or the parent node if no such property exists, until we reach a node representing an
interrupt controller. To give an example, the I2C controller /soc/i2c@7e804000 in the
Raspberry Pi 4 device tree can raise the shared peripheral interrupt (SPI) 117, which will
be served by the interrupt controller /soc/gicv400@40041000 because it is the root
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node’s parent interrupt controller.
Using these dependency relationships between devices, we can also build a dependency
graph as a better representation or visualization of all relationships. Note, that in most cases
the device tree will turn into a directed acyclic dependency graph and in some cases even
into a graph containing cycles. As an example, we visualized the dependency graph of the
Raspberry Pi 4 in figure A.2 in the appendix. The ethernet controller in the lower right
corner loops back to itself via a dependency on a device on its child Management Data
I/O (MDIO) bus (see figure A.2 in the appendix). This graph also shows the central role
of a few select devices which are providers for most other devices in the device tree: the
interrupt controller, the GPIO chip via its child nodes representing single pins or pin groups,
and the main hardware clock provider cprman.
In general, we need to assume that a dependency is mandatory because we do not know
whether the consumer’s driver works without the provider’s services. Some drivers might
have a fallback option, or the dependency might provide optional functionality, however we
cannot make this assumption in the general case. In practice this means that in order to be
able to use a certain hardware chip, we also need to make sure that we are operating all of
its providers and their drivers. This becomes important during the initial design phase of a
system.
3.2.3 Disabled Devices in the Device Tree
We also want to discuss the relationship of the devices, which we expect to be candidates for
deactivation, with the device tree. These hardware components typically provide functional-
ity that can directly be interacted with or seen by the user of the IoT system. In addition, they
are mostly leaf nodes in the dependency graph with no consumers other than child nodes.
The only exceptions are peripheral bus interfaces, which means the devices connected to that
peripheral bus are dependent on the bus controller as a parent-child dependency. This theory
can be confirmed by looking at device trees of typical IoT boards such as the Raspberry Pi 4
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in figure A.2. All the devices that we aim to make deactivatable, including I2C, SPI, Camera
Serial Interface (CSI) and UART controllers or their child nodes in the device tree, do not
have any non-child dependencies. This also makes sense from a user’s perspective, who sees
the entire system as a black box providing some features which can be used independently,
without having to worry about intra-device dependencies.
In conclusion, we can assume that all devices which our system should be able to
deactivate do not act as provider for any other device that is not deactivatable. Further, any
dependencies between deactivatable devices do not create cycles among them, since they
are usually parent-child dependency edges. Thereby, the set of devices controlled by the
TCB can remain constant regardless of which peripherals the user has enabled or disabled.
3.3 Enforcing Deactivated Devices
The IoT devices we are considering in our problem statement provide many different fea-
tures, which are typically implemented across multiple integrated circuits and peripherals
external to the main board. In conclusion, these components must communicate with the
driving software via peripheral interfaces on the main board hosting the CPU. Reusing our
initial example, many of the candidate devices for disabling in order to mitigate vulnerabil-
ities are peripherals that are connected via some peripheral (bus) interface such as UART,
I2C, SPI or CSI. It is therefore undesirable to disable an entire peripheral bus interface as
a whole if there is more than one device connected to it, since we want to retain as many
features as possible while disabling the smallest number of hardware components to make
sure the vulnerabilities in question cannot be exploited. In conclusion, only using the iso-
lation mechanisms provided by TrustZone will not suffice for our goals. Instead, our main
tool for denying the OS access to devices must include virtualization and device emulation,
supplemented by the use of SMMUs wherever possible.
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3.3.1 Device Conflicts
Another reason why virtualization is required is the central role played by a few controllers,
which leads to device conflicts. As we have discovered in our analysis of the device de-
pendencies in the Raspberry Pi 4, there are some core components with many consumer
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Figure 3.1: Minimal example for a device conflict. For completeness, the original parent-
child relationships are indicated with dashed black lines where they are not regarded as
dependencies. If the I2C controller is enabled to be usable by the OS, and the MMC reader
is security critical for the TCB, both domains would require control of the GPIO controller.
The GIC allows provides separate controls via its GIC and vGIC interfaces.
This means that some of these devices’ consumers will be enabled for use by the op-
erating system, some might be disabled and some others are required by the TCB or con-
figuration interface. Both the main OS, as well as the TCB, must be able to control some
of the resources provided by the device. We call this situation, in which two devices in
different domains have a common dependency, a device conflict. Unless the hardware pro-
vides special support for sharing the resources by these devices, this can only be achieved
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by giving the TCB full control over the device, which has to emulate it for the guest such
that permitted interactions with the device are forwarded to it. For example, let the I2C
controller in figure 3.1 be a device that is enabled for the main IoT operating system, while
the MMC controller is critical for the TCB. Although the GIC provides separate interfaces
for the secure world/hypervisor and non-secure world/guest, the GPIO controller can only
be controlled by one domain at a time. Such a partition on a sub-controller granularity is
not possible purely using TrustZone’s division into the secure and non-secure world, hence
we need virtualization and device emulation as an enforcement method.
Further, even if the conflicting device that is critical for the TCB is not actively being
used by it, its consumed resources must be protected from the OS. For example, granting
the OS full access to a GPIO controller that is the center of a device conflict would still
allow the OS to use software for simulating the actions of the consuming controllers on the
used pins, which would be the MMC controller in figure 3.1. This is also referred to as bit
banging.
At the same time, the fact that we need virtualization as an enforcement method also
means a shift in paradigm: instead of thinking about how we can disable and forbid access
to a device, we now need to think about how devices can be made available to the virtual
machine while still fulfilling our initial goals. On the upside, any device that the virtual
machine is granted access to can also be disabled by simply not granting access to it.
3.3.2 Resource Conflicts
Some devices manage multiple resources which can be requested or controlled by consumers
one at a time. For example, the GPIO controller manages multiple pins, and clock providers
can have an arbitrary number of output clocks. Two devices are said to have a resource
conflict if they consume the same resource provided by the same device. For example, two
separate controllers could require the same output clock of the same provider, or the same
GPIO pin. Resource conflicts can also include overlapping register regions.
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Although discouraged by the device tree compiler via a warning message, we discov-
ered several examples of devices which list registers at the same physical address. For
example, the Nvidia Jetson TK12 contains two nodes mapping device registers in a 16kB
region starting at 0x7d000000 in the physical address space, /usb@7d000000 and
/usb-phy@7d000000.
Conflicting consumers must always be controlled by the same domain, because sharing
a resource between the untrusted OS and the TCB jeopardizes the secure operation of the
consumer in the TCB. However, an enabled device controlled by the OS may have a resource
conflict with a deactivated device.
3.3.3 Sub-page MMIO Regions
We also noticed that many device’s registers are mapped in memory regions that are smaller
than a page. In addition, we also discovered multiple systems, including the Raspberry Pi
4, which map multiple MMIO devices on the same page in the physical address space. If a
disabled device is mapped to the same page as an enabled device, this configuration would
only be enforceable with the trap and emulate approach using virtualization. IOMMUs
would not suffice in this situation either, because they map entire pages, just like the MMU.
3.4 Virtualization and Device Dependencies
Since we will require virtualization to enforce disabled devices, we will have two domains
into which devices will be partitioned. The TCB must be in complete control of all con-
trollers and resources that are critical for it in order to enforce the virtual machine boundary,
plus the hardware required so the user can interact with the configuration application. This
includes the CPU, memory, interrupt controllers, all SMMUs and the block device used
for loading the hypervisor. It is important to note that controlling those devices does not
necessarily mean that the TCB is actively using these devices. Instead, it is sufficient to
2See the DTS file /arch/arm/boot/dts/tegra124.dtsi in the Linux kernel v4.19 [16]
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block the guest from using these devices, in the same way disabled devices are shielded
from the guest.
Similarly, each component might require access to its dependencies in order to provide
its functionality. Because we do not trust the main OS, and by extension therefore the
entire guest domain, we must make sure that all devices on which a TCB controlled device
depends are also in control of the TCB. In the dependency graph, this means that all devices
reachable from devices that are critical for the TCB’s operation must be under control of the
TCB. For our purposes, where the device assignment to different domains never changes, it
is sufficient to perform this analysis once during the design phase of the system.
Vice versa, the dependencies of any device that is enabled and directly controlled by the
guest domain must also be assigned to the guest, unless it is an emulated device.
3.5 Deactivating Devices as a Partitioning Problem
One of the simplest solution for splitting the hardware components into TCB and VM
controlled devices would be passing all devices through to the VM, however for DMA
capable devices this would violate our security requirements. Similarly, paravirtualizing
all devices that should be usable by the guest also defeats our original motivation, since
the device drivers would be part of the TCB, which contradicts our goal of a small TCB.
Instead, the smalled possible TCB can be achieved by using different device virtualization
methods for each hardware component based on each component’s properties. With help
of the dependency graph, we can ensure that each controller can still properly provide its
functionality.
Using the device dependency graph and its requirements, we can now think of our
challenges as a (graph) partitioning problem, since our goal is a partition of hardware com-
ponents into enabled and disabled devices. Namely, the hardware components must be split
into three domains: security critical devices for TCB, disabled devices and enabled devices
usable by the main IoT OS and application. A small example is shown in figure 3.2. Every
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dependency edge crossing the partition boundary requires the provider of that dependency
to be paravirtualized so that the OS can access its services and resources.
In many scenarios there is only one possible way to do so, as in this example with the
spi controller if it was enabled. However, for some configurations there can be multiple
options as shown in figure 3.2, where there are two levels of nodes between a device which
we want to enable or disable and the root node. In this example, the OS could control the
I2C device and virtualize its services to the operating system so that the OS can access its
child devices. Alternatively, the gpio controller and clock provider could be virtualized
by the TCB such that their resources consumed by the TCB are separated and inaccessible
to the OS. The I2C controller could then be passed through to the guest. Note, that the two
options provide different levels of granularity for deactivating devices, because the second
option would only allow the entire I2C bus to be deactivated. On the other hand, the first
option should result in a smaller TCB since only one controller must be virtualized. It is
therefore crucial to define what devices should be deactivatable by the user, as we have
done in the beginning of this chapter, in order to find the best partition that satisfies our
requirements as well as our initial security goals.
3.6 I/O Device Virtualization Strategy
In light of our dependency analysis, it is also helpful to use another classification for the
I/O device virtualization strategies presented in section 2.3. As opposed to the traditional
classification that focuses on the interface exposed by the hypervisor to a VM, our classifi-
cation focuses on which domain has to manage a device’s dependencies, which means there























Figure 3.2: Example device partitions visualized in a graph. The label next to each peripheral
indicates what domain they should be assigned to. For the sake of partitioning, the disabled
devices can be thought of being controlled the TCB to reduce the number of partitions to
two. However, disabled devices are not being used by the TCB in reality.
3.6.1 Guest Managed Device Virtualization
In the first case, the VM has to manage the dependencies of a virtualized device. The obvious
example includes devices that are passed through to the guest. In addition, fully virtualized
devices can also be considered to part of this class, since the hypervisor would normally
just validate and forward register accesses to the physical registers of the virtualized device.
Since the virtual machine has to manage the devices dependencies, it must also be able
to access all of the devices dependencies. Further, guest managed device virtualization adds
little to no complexity to the hypervisor, making this class of virtualization drivers the
preferred one.
3.6.2 Hypervisor Managed Device Virtualization
The second option is to give the hypervisor complete control over a virtualized device,
including the responsibility of managing its dependencies. Only paravirtualized devices are
27
part of this class since the reason for a HAL is to abstract away the hardware, including
dependencies between single components.
The burden of abstracting the hardare lies with the hypervisor for this class. This means
that using this kind of virtualization adds the complexity of the device driver, the operating
system’s subsystem for the device type and the paravirtualization driver to the hypervisor.
On the upside, it allows a very fine-grained control over hardware resources. In terms of
dependency management, all providers for hypervisor managed devices are required to be
controlled and accessible by the hypervisor.
3.6.3 Shareability
A device is called shareable or shared if it can have consumers managed by the hypervisor
and guest at the same time. It is therefore not a quality of the device itself, but of a device
and a virtualization driver for it. Most importantly, this is only possible if the resources or
services provided by a device are strictly separate and independently usable between hyper-
visor and guest side consumers, since otherwise the security of the resources consumed by
devices controlled by the hypervisor cannot be guaranteed in terms of integrity and avail-
ability. Shareable devices are necessary in some situations order to resolve device conflicts.
This can be the case, for example, when a paravirtualized device depends on another device,
which also requires paravirtualization. If a device requires no other configuration or depen-
dencies, full virtualization can also be used for this purpose by limiting the VM’s access to
registers associated with the resources that should be accessible to the guest.
Per definition, the GIC is always shareable.
3.7 Economy of Virtualization versus Deactivation
It is also important to consider the effect of using I/O device virtualization as a means to
later disable hardware components with regard to our initial goal of preventing exploitation
of certain vulnerabilities or reducing the attack surface. This goal can only be reached if the
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size and complexity of the TCB is as small as possible. Therefore, a balance between the
utility of virtualizing device components and the thereby reduced complexity of the entire
system must be found, not just for the state of the entire system where devices are actually
deactivated but also in the standard configuration of the system where all components are
activated and (ab)usable. The cost of virtualizing a hardware component in terms of added
complexity to the TCB should always be reasonably low compared to the complexity of the
devices which we can deactivate as a result of using the virtualized device.
Therefore, a device that should be deactivatable by the user must either be passed through
to the guest or fully virtualized using a proxy-like implementation as described in sec-
tion 2.3.2. Paravirtualizing a device that should be deactivatable would just shift the driver
from the virtual machine into the hypervisor. This would be at odds with our understanding
of a trusted TCB since the untrusted driver, which we wanted to deactivate in case of a
vulnerability, would become part of the TCB.
Instead, paravirtualization proves useful for devices providing resources and services to
other hardware components as an enabler for deactivation of its consumers. This includes
controllers of peripheral buses, which can be understood as providing its address space
as a resource to each device connected via the peripheral bus. Apart from that, paravirtu-
alization can also be used at reasonable cost for the core components of an IoT system
with many consumers, which are already required by the TCB regardless of the guest’s
configuration. This is the case because the hypervisor already contains a driver for these
components. In the example of the Raspberry Pi 4, such devices include the GPIO controller
/soc/gpio@7e200000, the hardware clock provider /soc/cprman@7e101000 and
the DMA controller on the SoC, /soc/dma@7e007000, because all of them are required
by the hypervisor in order to read from the main SD card using the MMC controller
/soc/emmc2@7e340000.
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3.8 Considerations For Disabling Devices on Peripheral Buses
While there are hardware assisted security mechanisms providing security guarantees for
the system and peripheral interconnect, the same cannot be said for peripheral bus systems.
Each peripheral bus communication interface requires special considerations when thinking
about how to enable or disable access to bus devices in a virtualized system.
For example, devices connected via PCI support memory mapped I/O and can initiate
DMA transactions via the PCI controller. IOMMUs can used to mediate DMA transactions,
which allows PCI devices to be passed through to virtual machine guests. The PCI controller
must be fully or paravirtualized if access to some devices on the PCI bus should be restricted.
To give another example, the I2C bus allows communication with I2C connected devices
via the bus controller [17]. For I2C controllers supporting slave mode, other devices con-
nected to the I2C bus can request to become the bus master, which allows them to initiate I2C
transactions independently of the controller and thereby directly communicate with devices
on the I2C bus. It is therefore sufficient to emulate the I2C controller and prevent usage of
slave mode as well as transactions to addresses of blocked devices. Devices connected via
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Figure 4.1: Proposed system architecture allowing single devices to be disabled using virtu-
alization.
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Based on our conclusions and requirements of our analysis in chapter 3, we developed
the architecture shown in figure 4.1. The system uses a Type-1 hypervisor setup. The guest
virtual machine runs the main operating system and application code providing the features
seen by the user. From the guest’s point of view, the framework represents a hardware
abstraction layer that grants access to different subset of all devices in the IoT depending
on the user’s configuration. Using the concepts and conclusions from our analysis, the
framework allows to use different virtualization strategies for the devices in the IoT system.
The configuration application, where the user can choose what hardware components
to disable, runs as a second virtual machine, either on top of a small operating system or
as a barebone application. Similar to the Dom0 virtual machine in the Xen hypervisor, it
has special administrative privileges over the hypervisor, including the options to start and
stop the guest and reconfigure the hypervisor. It is therefore part of the TCB. Alternatively,
it would even be possible to merge the configuration app into the hypervisor; however,
implementing the interface with all its required drivers might be easier in a small virtual
machine. Together with the hypervisor, the configuration application and core constitute the
trusted computing base of the IoT system, seen as just a HAL by the guest.
Similar to the BIOS setup menu, the configuration application is executed during the
start of the device before the guest is booted. This makes sure that the guest cannot interfere
with the configuration app itself, as there might be an overlap in required hardware. For
example, the main IoT application and the configuration interface could use the same screen.
In order to make the configuration app and the main IoT applications distinguishable, there
must be at least one indicator, such as an LED, that is controlled by the TCB which signals to
the user when the secure configuration interface is shown. This helps to prevent UI redress
attacks where the user believes that they are interacting with the configuration interface,
whereas in reality the interface shown to the user is imitated from within the guest VM. It is
further important that the entire device is completely restarted before the guest is restarted
with a new configuation in order to make sure that each controller accessible to the guest
33
is reset properly. If the IoT device is not restarted, a hardware component that is not reset
by the guest at startup would continue to operate with the configuration written to it by the
previous guest, which would violate our security requirements.
The configuration core is responsible for processing the user selection, determining what
devices need to be accessible by the guest and finally reconfiguring the hypervisor. To this
end, it contains a helper component for each virtualization driver, which takes care of config-
uring that virtualization driver for a given user selection and generating the corresponding
device tree node for the guest.
In conclusion of our analysis in chapter 3, a subset of hardware components that may
be disabled by the user must be defined during the development and implementation of
this framework for a specific IoT device and appropriate virtualization drivers fulfilling all
requirements mentioned in our analysis must be implemented.
4.2 Boot Sequence
Initially, the configuration application has full control over the required hardware using
the passthrough assignment, therefore no device virtualization is required at this step. The
configuration app is preconfigured to show a list of hardware components to the user, who
can choose to disable them as required. Since the user sees the IoT device as a black box
and does not know about its internal architecture, the interface should show meaningful
descriptions of the features that a hardware provides. Internally, the configuration app maps
the description shown to the user, for example Camera left door, to the corresponding
node in the device tree, /soc/csi@7e801000. Dependencies between devices can be
visualized either by nesting the dependent device into a submenu or, in more complex
scenarios, by graying out those entries which cannot be enabled because of a disabled
dependency.
After the user confirms the update system configuration of which devices are enabled,
the configurator core runs our device assignment algorithm (see section 4.4) in order to
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determine which hardware devices need to be disabled and therefore do not require any
drivers to be loaded. Then, the hypervisor configuration must be updated to reflect the
changes so we can be sure that only the required devices are mapped into the guest.
Before the guest is started, the configuration application also writes the selected hard-
ware configuration, that is the list of enabled and disabled devices, to a permanent storage
so that the configuration can persist over device reboots until the user decides to reconfigure
the device. Lastly, the configuration changes must be communicated to the main operating
system. Since the device tree is the de facto standard for device discovery in the ARM
world, and because the configuration application and the configuration core internally use
the device tree to represent all devices and emulation drivers, we decided to communicate
the system’s current device configuration to the guest via the device tree as well.
After that, the configuration application surrenders control of the hardware and is ter-
minated so that the guest can be started. The hypervisor then loads and starts the guest
virtual machine including the IoT operating system and application. Since at this point the
configuration application is not executing anymore, we have avoided all device or resource
conflicts between the configuration application and the guest. Further, besides central sys-
tem components like the MMU, SMMU or GIC and paravirtualized systems, the hypervisor
should not actively use any other device in order to minimize the need for shareable devices.
For example, after loading the guest kernel into memory, and potentially a initial RAM
filesystem, the hypervisor will not require access to any block storage or the boot medium
anymore. Therefore, the block device drivers should be unloaded to avoid conflicts with the
guest and otherwise unnecessary shareable virtualization drivers.
4.3 Configuration Sources
Our framework requires several configuration sources for different purposes, as depicted in
















Figure 4.2: System configuration flow. The blue configurations are statically configured
during the development of a system using the framework, while the red ones are dynamically
determined at runtime.
4.3.1 System device tree
The System device tree is the device tree describing the hardware on the system. Since
modifications may be applied to the system device tree by the firmware or bootloader
during the boot, the configuration core must use the initialized device tree containing these
changes.
4.3.2 System configuration
The system configuration consists of three configuration items. First, it contains an assign-
ment of each device to either the TCB or the guest. Devices assigned to the guest can also
be annotated as deactivatable, if the device is not required by the guest. All devices that the
user may disable using the configuration application must be marked as deactivatable.
Second, the system configuration describes the virtualization type and driver to be used
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for each device that can be exposed to the guest. This includes whether the virtualization
strategy allows a device to be shared and whether it would be managed by the hypervisor
or by the guest. Furthermore, similar to how each driver can be configured for each device
in the device tree, options for each virtualization driver and device can be specified here.
The first two configuration options must also meet the requirements stated in our analysis
with regard to accessibility of resources and services provided and consumed by devices in
each domain.
Lastly, the system configuration also contains the base device tree for the guest, which
contains some static configuration parameters. This can include the device tree’s CPU nodes
and other nodes not directly related to an actual hardware device such as the /chosen node
specifying boot parameters.
4.3.3 Toggleable devices
The set of toggleable devices contains all devices which may be disabled by the user, which
is only important for the configuration application. Combined with the user’s choice, the
configuration application will yield the peripheral assignment describing which hardware
components should be functional and enabled for the guest and which should be disabled.
This list must be a subset of all devices marked as deactivatable in the system configuration.
Devices such as an I2C controller, which do not provide services directly to the user
but connect peripherals providing features to the user, would be assigned to the guest and
marked as deactivatable, but they would not be in the set of toggleable devices.
4.3.4 Generated configurations
After the configuration core runs the device assignment algorithm, it will generate two
configuration files reflecting the user’s choices:
Hypervisor configuration The hypervisor configuration defines which hardware resources
and devices the guest can access. It also includes configuration options for all device
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virtualization drivers.
Guest device tree The guest device tree is used by the guest’s operating system for loading
the corresponding drivers. Its generation from the base device tree contained in the
system device tree is detailed in section 4.4.2.
4.4 Configuration Core
The heart of our framework is the configuration core, which assigns devices to the guest as
required, regenerates the device trees for the guest and reconfigures the hypervisor.
4.4.1 Device Assignment
In order to minimize the number of enabled devices and the size of the TCB, the configu-
ration core computes all hardware components reachable in the dependency graph starting
from security critical devices, device always required by the guest and enabled peripherals.
Following the design principle of least privilege [18], all devices not included in the set
of reachable devices can be disabled, even if they have not been disabled explicitly by the
user. For instance, using the Raspberry Pi 4 dependency graph as an example, if all devices
on the I2C bus are disabled, then the main I2C controller /soc/i2c@7e804000 can be
disabled as well, since it is unused. Similarly, if there were any dependencies of this I2C
controller, which are not security critical and not used by any other enabled device, these
could be disabled as well.
Since the system configuration must satisfy all dependencies and the rules of the virtual-
ization strategy for each device accessible to the guest, the resulting assignment of devices
into TCB, guest and disabled devices also satisfies all of these constraints.
4.4.2 Generating the Guest Device Tree
After each device has been assigned to the TCB, the guest or has been disabled, the device
tree for the guest can be generated. To this end, the nodes corresponding to disabled devices
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in the base guest device tree are simply removed, with one exception. As mentioned in the
analysis, we can also disable devices which do not have any enabled consumers and are not
marked as required by the TCB or the guest.
Then, the guest’s device tree can be generated or translated node by node in a pre-order
iteration of the device tree. In order to translate the node for the guest tree, we differentiate
three cases based on whether or how the device corresponding to the device tree node is
made accessible to the guest:
Passed-through or fully virtualized device : The contents of the device tree node are
copied.
Paravirtualized device : The helper component of the virtualization driver generates a
new device tree node based on the original node from the initialized device tree.
Not exposed to guest : The node is omitted from the guest device tree.
After translation, all references in properties of a node must be updated to point to the
translated node. Then, the translated node is inserted into the guest device tree as a child of
its translated parent.
However, when a parent-child relationship is not regarded as a dependency, this means
that the parent node has no corresponding entry in the guest device tree. Since, in this case,
the parent device has no significant function that is required to access the child, it is safe to
replace it with a dummy simple-bus node that retains standardized device tree properties.
The correctness of the resulting device tree follows from the fact that the dependency graph
is a supergraph of the device tree with exception of some parent-child relationships which
we handle separately.
4.4.3 Hypervisor Configuration
The helper components for each virtualization driver in the configuration core also each
generate parts of the hypervisor configuration according to the user’s selection. For example,
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if the user decides to disable a device connected via I2C, the corresponding address on the
I2C bus must be blacklisted by the I2C virtualization driver.
Then, the hypervisor can configure the GIC, MMU and SMMU, if one is present, ac-
cording to the requirements of each device that is enabled for the guest. To this end, for each
device that is made accessible to the guest, the helper component of the used virtualization
strategy defines what hardware resources must be made accessible to the guest. For guest
managed devices, this includes the interrupts and MMIO regions specified for the device in
the device tree. Hypervisor managed devices likely have different requirements depending
on the virtualization strategy used. For example, the helper component of a paravirtualiza-
tion driver can request different interrupts and a communication region in memory for the
purpose of virtualizing a hardware component, instead of the original hardware resources
specified for the virtualized device in the device tree.
4.5 Deactivating Devices Outside the Device Tree
In some cases, devices for which deactivation may be desired are not listed in the device tree,
as we have shown with the example of the WiFi controller in the Raspberry Pi 4. Similarly,
devices completely controlled in userspace usually do not have an entry in the device tree.
In order to support these devices for deactivation, pseudo entries without a compatible
string may be added to the system device tree. Alternatively, in order to separate the actual
system device tree from pseudo nodes, the hypervisor can load additional pseudo nodes as a
device tree overlay before starting the configuration interface. Then, the helper component
for the virtualization driver used for the bus in question must be able to infer based on these
added nodes what resources or addresses to make available to the guest.
For example, in order to support deactivation of the WiFI controller in the Raspberry Pi
4, a pseudo node specifying the controllers address must be added to the device tree. Apart
from that, an appropriate emulation driver for the MMC controller and the correct system
configuration is required.
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We implemented the proposed framework for demonstration purposes using the Jailhouse
hypervisor [19], a Linux hypervisor designed for static hardware partitioning in realtime sys-
tems using asynchronous multiprocessing (AMP). The configuration core is implemented
in Python 3.
Jailhouse
Jailhouse combines the advantages of traditional Type-1 and Type-2 hypervisors into one
system, see figure 5.1. First, the IoT system boots directly into a complete Linux system
which has control over the entire hardware. We will call this system the host. This is similar
to Type-2 hypervisors before the hypervisor is started. Then, it activates the hypervisor via a
kernel module, which lifts itself below the operating system, taking control of the GIC and
second level address translation. The main Linux system now runs inside a virtual machine









Figure 5.1: Jailhouse hypervisor initialization.
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Dom0 in the Type-1 Xen hypervisor. As a guest virtual machine is started, called non-
root cell in Jailhouse, the hardware resources assigned to it are taken away from the host.
Jailhouse comes with support for SMMUs and the GIC. Selective PCI device passthrough
by full emulation of a PCI Express (PCIe) controller is currently only supported on x86.
It also supports passing through devices to guests and granting guests access to memory
regions on a sub-page granularity. In addition, it already supports hardware device partition
using pass-through assignment.
We chose the Jailhouse hypervisor because of its partitioning capabilities and the po-
tential to reuse existing Linux device drivers for the host while also keeping the size of the
hypervisor itself small. Further, the non-traditional design of Jailhouse allows us to use the
main advantage of a Type-2 hypervisor for our purposes, namely being in full control of the
entire hardware in order to show the configuration interface before the guest boots. Yet, at
runtime of the guest the system is effectively powered by a Type-1 hypervisor. This is an
effective method for sharing hardware between the configuration interface and the main IoT
application without running into additional device or resource conflicts. This also means
that the hypervisor itself requires no hardware drivers, except for the security critical devices
such as the SMMU, MMU or GIC. As a result, drivers for devices such as memory cards or
other block devices used as boot medium are not part of the hypervisor itself. Although this
means that our implementation is constructed slightly differently compared to the proposed
architecture in figure 4.1, the interface from the IoT operating system’s point of view has
not changed and in our opinion, the benefits of using the Jailhouse hypervisor in a practical
implementation justify the internal changes in the TCB.
At runtime, our implementation therefore functions as shown in figure 5.2, as opposed
to the architecture of the general framework displayed in figure 4.1. Most devices requir-
ing emulation are controlled by the host, especially shared devices, since the host already
supports a wide range of drivers. This significantly reduces the need for reimplementation
of device drivers in the hypervisor. Device emulation is faciliated by the inter-VM com-
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munication driver described in the following section. The hypervisor is only in control of
system components like the MMU, SMMU and GIC. In addition, fully virtualized devices
with all dependencies controlled by the hypervisor can also be virtualized by the hypervisor
for better performance.
In order to prevent unnecessary device and resource conflicts, the host can be booted
from an initial RAM filesystem containing device and virtualization drivers and the config-
uration application. The current configuration and the guest that will be booted are loaded
from a storage device that is mounted by the operating system for this purpose and un-
mounted before the guest starts. Further, all devices and their drivers which are not required
anymore are unloaded, rendering the entire host idle with the exception of the virtualization
drivers.
H A R D W A R E
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Figure 5.2: System architecture of our implementation after the guest has been started.
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Inter-VM Communication Driver
Although Jailhouse already comes with an inter-VM shared memory (IVSHMEM) driver
supporting emulation of ethernet devices or block devices, it requires an emulated PCIe
device for this purpose and it is primarily designed to be used by applications. To support
device emulation, we implemented a simpler communication driver in the hypervisor, which
maps a configurable amount of memory into both the host and the guest. The driver allows
each virtual machine to signal the other using an emulated doorbell register, which injects an
interrupt in the other domain. Further, it can separate memory regions for multiple emulation
drivers using the communication interface. The communication interface, including what
memory regions are shared, are part of the general hypervisor configuration. What interrupt
is used for signaling can be freely chosen by each virtual machine separately (guest and
host) and changed at runtime within the interrupts enabled for a domain.
The interface of the kernel module, which can be used by emulation drivers, provides
following functions:
• init device: maps the memory regions associated with an emulated device iden-
tifier (ID). The memory region corresponding to the device ID must be configured in
the hypervisor configuration.
• exit device: unmaps the memory regions associated with an emulated device.
• register handler: tells the driver to execute the passed function when it re-
ceives a notification for the emulated device from the other end of the emulation
driver pair.
• unregister handler: unregisters a notification handler.
• notify: notifies the driver on the other end of the emulation driver pair.
The memory mapped by the communication driver is synchronized and cached in the
CPU’s cache hierarchy. Any communication protocol can be used on top of the communi-
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cation interface, for example I/O rings or the VirtIO transport protocol (without VirtIO’s
device layer since devices are statically described in the device tree) [20].
5.1.2 Configuration
The configuration structure is the same compared with the proposed framework, except that
the configuration of the host system is an additional output of the configuration core. The
main hypervisor configuration is stored as a template which can be adjusted based on the
current configuration. The parts of the system configuration related to device assignment,
emulation drivers and their (constant) configuration options are organized in a device tree
overlay, which is merged with the host’s device tree when the configuration core is initiated
by the configuration application. We chose this design because of our similar requirements
of per-device configuration and matching with emulation drivers. This overlay also specifies
for each device, whether the parent-child relationship with its children must be regarded a
dependency.
In order to load the correct virtualization drivers in the host, each helper component in
the configuration core generates a device tree overlay based on a driver specific template.
This node also contains the configuration options for the virtualization driver. After the user
confirms their chosen device configuration, the drivers of devices that will be controlled
by the guest are unloaded by the host and the devices removed from the host’s device tree.
Then, the overlays are applied to the host device tree before the guest is started, so that all
emulated devices are ready to be used. By using this approach, we can also load the same
virtualization driver for multiple devices of the same kind.
5.1.3 Extracting Dependencies from the Device Tree
Since the initialized device tree, from which we want to extract device dependencies, comes
in its compiled form, higher level concepts in properties, such as strings or references,
cannot be reconstructed for custom properties, as the interpretation is up to the compatible
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drivers. In order to support extracting all dependencies even for device specific properties,
we modified the device tree compiler to insert a special dependencies property into
each node in the device tree. Similar to how debug information can be added to binary
programs during compilation, this property lists the location of each reference as a byte
offset within the property that contains the reference. This approach allows reconstruction
of all node dependencies from a compiled device tree at runtime, even the ones that have
been updated by the firmware or bootloader.
5.2 Example: Raspberry Pi 4
To give a demonstration of the framework and our implementation, we implemented virtu-
alization strategies for two hardware components of the Raspberry Pi 4. We also attached a
Sense HAT board to simulate an external integrated circuit connected via an I2C interface.
One hardship was the fact that the firmware executing before the bootloader expects
all hardware components of the standard configuration to be enabled. In order to prevent
the host to load built-in drivers for disabled devices, we added a script to the bootloader
which marks each node that corresponds to a deactivated device as disabled. In the same
way we experienced boot problems when the dependencies property was added
to each node. As a workaround, these properties are loaded as an overlay just before the
configuration core is started.
5.2.1 Example Fully Virtualized Device: Ethernet Controller
Our first hardware component which we made available to the guest is the Raspberry Pi’s
ethernet controller, /scb/genet@7d5800000. Although the user could simply unplug
the ethernet cable in order to prevent communication via the ethernet connection, we chose
this example as a proof for how a fully virtualized device can be made accessible to the
guest. The dependency graph of the Raspberry Pi 4 (figure A.2) reveals that the hardware
component only depends on the system’s interrupt controller and a grandchild node. Since
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all its descendants do not have any other external dependencies, the three nodes can be seen
as one functional unit.
As a matter of fact, out of our list of candidate devices for deactivation, this is the only
hardware component in the Raspberry Pi 4 that only depends on the GIC and therefore can
be virtualized using a guest managed technique without requiring virtualization of another
device.
Because the ethernet controller contains integrated DMA capabilities, we must use full
virtualization in order to prevent DMA attacks. To this end, we implemented a generic
DMA filer mechanism in Jailhouse based on the trap and emulate principle. It intercepts all
accesses to emulated MMIO registers which accept parts of an DMA descriptor (address and
size of a device-to-memory or memory-to-device DMA transaction). At the same time, this
filter also translates the DMA address from guest physical address space into the machine
physical address space, thereby simulating the functionality of an SMMU. All descriptors
that reference regions not mapped to the VM are discarded as an attempted DMA attack.
In case of the Raspberry Pi’s ethernet controller, DMA descriptors can be written to
two MMIO regions at offsets 0x2000 and 0x4000 from the first register of the device, so
0xfd582000 and 0xfd584000. Each region contains 768 registers for 256 consecutive
DMA descriptors consisting of a 32 bit size register and two registers for the lower and
upper 32 bits of a 64 bit address.
The child MDIO bus and the genet-phy controller on it are neither memory mapped
nor able to initiate DMA transactions, both of the ethernet controller’s descendants can
therefore be passed through. Since all three components are managed by the guest, all of
their dependencies are satisfied.
In the end, the ethernet controller is accessible from the guest and the guest is able to
connect to a local network with Gigabit link speed. We noticed that the ethernet controller
cannot be used when the guest is restarted without restarting the entire system including
the host, which could indicate that the device driver does not shut down the controller
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1 genet@7d580000 {
2 jhmgr,strategy = <(STRATEGY_EMULATE
3 | STRATEGY_GUEST_MANAGED)>;
4 jhmgr,compatible = "dma-proxy";
5 jhmgr,dmadescs =




10 <0x4000 0x4 0x0 0xc 256 0xc ..>;
11 __dependencies__ = "phy-handle", <0>;
12
13 mdio@e14 {
14 jhmgr,strategy = <STRATEGY_PASSTHROUGH>;
15
16 genet-phy@0 {




Figure 5.3: Configuration for the Raspberry Pi 4 ethernet controller in the system configura-
tion.
properly. Also, after powering down the guest virtual machine only and restarting it with the
ethernet controller disabled, the controller still seems to process incoming network packets
as indicated by the blinking activity LED next to the socket. However, once the entire device
is restarted including the host, the controller is inactive. Since the it is not part of any power
domain that could be powered off, the ethernet controller is still powered at all times.
5.2.2 Example Virtualized Device: I2C Bus Controller
The main I2C controller that is active by default, /soc/i2c@7e804000g, is connected
to the Sense HAT extension in our setup. The Sense HAT board simulates an external circuit
board with 5 connected I2C devices, 4 sensors and the pixel grid including joystick, all of
which can be controlled separately. To allow selectively disabling these devices, the I2C
controller must be emulated.
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Each address on the I2C bus can be thought of as a separate resource provided by the
device. The I2C controller also supports slave mode, which allows connected I2C devices
to directly communicate with each other. Therefore, the use of this mode by the guest must
be prevented.
Since the I2C controller depends on the main hardware clock and the GPIO controller, it
must be paravirtualized from the host. This also means we can reuse the main I2C driver and
emulate the device at the interface level of the I2C subsystem in Linux. Devices accessed
via the I2C bus can be, dependency permitting, passed through.
To make the Sense HAT controllable from the guest, we had to apply a small patch for
a known issue with the device drivers1. In addition, we patched the driver to be modular so
that the pixel grid can be used independently of the joystick, making the dependency on the
GPIO controller optional.
In the end, we are able to separately enable or disable the pressure sensor, humidity
sensor, magnetic sensor, acceleration sensor on the Sense HAT individually. The pixel
matrix can only be enabled or disabled together with the joystick, since they share are
controlled using the same I2C bus address.
5.2.3 Other Raspberry Pi Components
Similar to how we granted the guest access to the ethernet controller and the I2C controller,
this could also be done for the PCIe controller and SPI controllers. Jailhouse natively sup-
ports PCI emulation, which can be used to grant the guest access to a subset of the connected
PCI devices. However, at the time of writing, Jailhouse’s support for PCI passthrough on
ARM was not fully functional yet. Further, the enabled PCI devices would require emulation
or mediation by an SMMU in the real world, since they are able to access the entire physical
address space with DMA by using the PCIe controller as a bridge.
As with I2C, SPI also allows multiple devices connected to the same SPI controller. For
1https://github.com/raspberrypi/linux/issues/3300
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this reason, it is desirable to fully emulate the SPI controller in the same way as the I2C
controller to facilitate separate disabling of connected circuits.
The other peripheral controllers in the Raspberry Pi 4, all of which are in the top section
of the device graph in figure A.2, also fulfill our requirements for devices that should be de-
activatable defined in our analysis. In order to deactivate those devices, the central hardware
components /soc/gpio@7e200000 and /soc/cprman@7e101000 would need to
be paravirtualized, since we already determined in section 3.7 that paravirtualizing the de-
activatable devices themselves does not yield the potential reduction in attack surface that
we intend to get. In addition, the DMA controller /soc/dma@7e007000 must be made
available to the guest using full or paravirtualization. Then, each of the peripheral controllers
can either be passed through or fully virtualized to filter out rogue DMA transactions.
5.3 Evaluation
For evaluation of our example implementation of the framework, we will compare the
implementation with each of the security requirements initially stated in the introduction.
5.3.1 Tamper Proof
The configuration application and the guest are temporally isolated, and the configuration
itself cannot be accessed as they are stored on the SD card which is not accessible to the
guest. All boot programs and their configuration is stored on the SD card as well. As a
result, the guest cannot tamper with the configuration of the TCB.
5.3.2 Complete Mediation
We established in the background and analysis chapters what security primitives are avail-
able to us on the ARM platform and to what extent they can enforce the boundary between
the TCB and the operating system. The MMC controllers used for accessing the SD card that
stores the system configuration is part of the TCB and all facts established in the following
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apply to it as a result.
The memory that belongs to the TCB, comprised of the hypervisor’s and the host’s
memory, is completely shielded from regular memory accesses by the guest VM, since the
guest operates in a virtual address space that does not map the TCB’s memory regions.
All devices that we make available to the guest either cannot initiate DMA transactions,
which includes the devices on the I2C bus, or are fully or paravirtualized in order to prevent
and filter out DMA attacks. Similarly, only the interrupts associated with passed through
devices and fully virtualized devices are accessible to the guest VM, which is enforced by
the configuration of the vGIC through the hypervisor. Furthermore, even when all of the
Raspberry Pi’s peripheral controllers are enabled for the guest using the method described
above, paravirtualization of the central hardware components ensures that the guest cannot
interfere with the resources provided by these devices to those devices controlled by the
TCB.
It follows from all these facts that the guest cannot tamper with any hardware resource
consumed by the TCB, as well as the TCB itself or its configuration.
5.3.3 Correctness
Determining the correctness of our system is challenging and almost impossible to do with
perfect accuracy. Instead, we will use the size and complexity of the TCB in terms of lines
of code, and especially the complexity of its interfaces with the guest as a proxy for its
correctness. Table 5.1 breaks down the size of our implementation into different software
components2.
Each component listed in the table is of reasonable size. Although the Jailhouse hyper-
visor contains a lot of code, it contains mostly drivers for core hardware components such
as the GIC, MMU and SMMU, as well as the unused PCIe driver and virtualization driver.
Further, our communication driver contains barely any complexity, as it is only glue code
2Lines of code were determined using the tool sloccount
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Table 5.1: Lines of code for each component of our implementation.
Component Language LOC
Jailhouse (arm64) C, Assembly 5,423
VM communication driver C 671
- Frontend C 321
- Backend C 350
I2C device driver (Linux) C 478
I2C paravirtualization driver C 966
- Frontend C 460
- Backend C 506
DMA filter + translation C 304
Configuration core Python 3 1,469
Configuration app Python 3 112
Total C, Assembly, Python 3 9,423
- TCB C, Assembly, Python 3 8,642
for mapping statically configured memory regions into the VM’s address space, injecting
interrupts, and provides the small interface for kernel drivers described in section 5.1.1. Due
to the temporal isolation of the configuation application and the guest, the configuration
application and core cannot be interacted with by the assumed remote attacker, even when
the guest is compromised. Further, because of the very limited input options by the user,
all error states in the configuration application and core should have been covered by our
extensive testing.
The biggest issue with the implementation may be the fact that an entire Linux system
is running in the TCB throughout the lifetime of the system, and the guest is even able to
interact with it via the virtualization drivers. However, we argue that the actual interface
that can be used by the guest, the I2C paravirtualization driver, is sufficiently small to
prevent exploitation. About half of the I2C virtualization driver consists of device setup
and teardown code as well as handlers for the simple I2C interface functions, including bus
locking, unlocking, transferring a SMBus message and reading the device capabilities. The
most complex part is the serializing and deserializing code of 469 lines.
In conclusion, we have reason to believe that our implementation is correct.
53
5.3.4 Availability / No Interference
Because of the temporal isolation of the configuration application and the guest, the config-
uration application is guaranteed to operate correctly.
5.4 Discussion
The implementation and evaluation shows that running an entire Linux kernel in the host
indeed has merits and drawbacks. While the effect is rather small in our example due to the
simplicity of the I2C driver, being able to reuse device drivers that are already implemented
in Linux can be a great advantage for complex devices that must be supported by the TCB,
regardles of whether the hardware component is required by the configuration application
or must be paravirtualized for the guest. This greatly reduces the chance of bugs being
introduced by reimplementing a device driver. Further, the paravirtualization driver must
only be implemented once for each subsystem of the kernel and can be reused thereafter,
meaning that a larger community can maintain the correctness of its implementation as
opposed to just a single vendor or developer in case of a device-specific full virtualization
driver. One way to reduce the vast complexity of the LInux kernel would be to use a hardened
kernel.
Further, we also reduced the complexity of the paravirtualization transport as compared
to common solutions like VirtIO [20]. While VirtIO, just like Jailhouse’s builtin IVSHMEM
driver, uses emulated buses such as PCI to allow easy dynamic configuration via bus probing,
our approach does not require the additional emulation of an entire generic PCI controller,
which is even more beneficial when the hardware does not provide a PCI controller that
would warrant PCI emulation to restrict the accessible PCI devices.
5.4.1 Limitations
At the same time, there are a small number of limitations to our current implementation.
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First, it makes extensive use of the ARM Virtualization Extensions, which may not
be available on all systems where an implementation of our framework would be desired.
For example, ARM Cortex-M based processors do not provide any hardware virtualization
support. While we have not tested it, a trap and emulate or system-wide paravirtualiza-
tion approach should work in place of the hardware virtualization support, however with
significant performance overhead.
Second, with our implementation most paravirtualization would probably be imple-
mented using the same interface provided by the HAL of the Linux kernel for a specific
device class, just like we did for the I2C controller. This means that the guest is limited
to running the same version of Linux in order to make sure that it is compatible with the
interface exposed via paravirtualization. However, any other operating system, including
barebone applications, could be run in the guest virtual machine with the required frontend
driver implementation.
Third, with the current assignment algorithm, the I2C controller is paravirtualized even
when factory settings are used where all devices on the I2C bus are enabled. In this case,
paravirtualization only adds overhead and increases the complexity of the TCB without
adding any benefits until a device on the I2C bus is disabled.
Fourth, all deactivated devices in our example are not actually powered down and con-
tinue to operate, just without any interaction with the IoT operating system. For peripheral
devices that do not provide any communication channel to the outside world, this means
the device is consuming power while not being usable. However, for controllers facing the
outside world like the ethernet controller, the controller firmware is still being executed by
the controller and as a result, this setup would not guarantee that attackers cannot exploit
vulnerabilities in the controller’s firmware.
Lastly, the correctness of our dependency analysis, and thereby our entire assignment
algorithm and overall operability of the hardware by both the TCB and the guest, depends
on the assumption that we can predict what devices are present in an IoT system and what
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their dependencies are. However, boot programs executed before the hypervisor, or Linux
in our implementation, may arbitrarily change the device tree, including adding nodes or
introducing dependencies between devices. Unless the boot program cannot add any nodes
that are not contained in the system configuration, and entries for each added reference are
added to each node’s dependencies property, added devices are hidden from the
guest and it is possible that some devices do not function properly because the dependency
analysis yields incomplete or wrong results. For devices like the Raspberry Pi which have a




Apart from our framework, we briefly present other research on related problems.
6.1 Notary
Notary is a security-by-design software architecture for systems with very strict security
requirements, such as hardware wallets for cryptocurrencies or transaction approval agents
[21]. Notary achieves strong isolation and compartmentalization of system components by
executing them on physically separate CPUs. Software running on the system is further
simplified by resetting the entire CPU and using a deterministic startup sequence for each
program that allows the verification of the program’s correctness and security. Thereby,
Notary overcomes classes of bugs like vulnerabilities in the OS and side channels.
6.2 LTZvisor
LTZvisor is an experimental hypervisor that uses ARM TrustZone as an hardware backed
isolation mechanism as opposed to ARM Virtualization extensions [22, 23]. The hypervisor
supports both versions of ARM TrustZone, the more powerful variant on ARM Cortex-A
and the more simplistic one on ARM Cortex-M processors, and thereby can be used on
a wide range of IoT boards. At the moment, however, only a few development boards are
supported.
Further research has been conducted by the same authors towards enabling efficient




In this thesis, we presented a framework for deactivating single hardware components by
choice of the user, either in order to proactively reduce the overall attack surface of the
system or to retroactively mitigate known vulnerabilities. We formalized how hardware
components in complex ARM systems might interfere with each other and how this is
manifested in the device tree using the example of the Raspberry Pi 4. Using our insights,
we developed an extraction and visualization tool for device dependencies to ease correct
implementation of our framework and showed how virtualization is key to enforcing the
hardware partition between activated and deactivated devices. We further analyed and de-
fined requirements and rules for implementing our selective deactivation framework by
combining I/O device passthrough, full virtulalization and paravirtualization while ensuring
proper operability and security of the entire system with regard to our initial goals. Lastly,
we gave a proof of concept implementation that allows selectively disabling 6 different
components on the Raspberry Pi 4 and how similar effort can be used for other peripherals.
7.1 Future Work
There are several ways how the presented framework can further be extended. As we have
already mentioned in our discussion, the current implementation is limited to systems with
ARM Virtualization Extensions. By also supporting ARM TrustZone enabled virtualiation
as shown by Pinto et al., a larger range of devices could be supported. Integrating TrustZone
capabilities would also allow adding another hardware backed method for enabling I/O
devices which can initiate DMA transactions to the guest without adding any device specific
code.
The framework can also be extended by a TCB backed factory reset mechanism for the
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untrusted guest in case of a suspected infection of the IoT application. Further integration
with the power management controllers and reset mechanisms could be used to power
down unused devices and reduce the energy consumption of the IoT system. This would
be especially useful for deactivating controllers interacting with remote entities such as
Bluetooth, WiFi or ethernet controllers, since the controller’s firmware might still interact
with adversaries.
Lastly, a more complex assignment algorithm, which can optimize the virtualization
strategy used for each hardware components by choosing from a pool of strategies for each
component, could greatly reduce the added overhead to the system when factory settings





DEVICE TREE AND DEPENDENCIES
A.1 Raspberry Pi 4 Device Tree Source Code
1 /dts-v1/;
2 /memreserve/ 0 0x1000;
3 / {
4 compatible = "raspberrypi,4-model-b", "brcm,bcm2711";
5 model = "Raspberry Pi 4 Model B";
6 interrupt-parent = <&gicv2>;
7 #address-cells = <2>;
8 #size-cells = <1>;
9
10 chosen {




15 compatible = "simple-bus";
16 #address-cells = <1>;
17 #size-cells = <1>;
18 ranges = <0x7e000000 0x0 0xfe000000 0x01800000>,
19 <0x7c000000 0x0 0xfc000000 0x02000000>,
20 <0x40000000 0x0 0xff800000 0x00800000>;
21 dma-ranges = <0xc0000000 0x0 0x0 0x3c000000>;
22
23 dma: dma@7e007000 {
24 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-dma";
25 reg = <0x7e007000 0xb00>;
26 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 80 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, ..;
27 interrupt-names = "dma0", "dma1", ..;
28 #dma-cells = <1>;
29 brcm,dma-channel-mask = <0x1f5>;
30 };
31
32 pm: watchdog: watchdog@7e100000 {
33 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-pm", "brcm,bcm2835-pm-wdt";
34 #power-domain-cells = <1>;
61
35 #reset-cells = <1>;
36 reg = <0x7e100000 0x114>,
37 <0x7e00a000 0x24>,
38 <0x7ec11000 0x20>;
39 clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_V3D>, ..;




44 clocks: cprman@7e101000 {
45 compatible = "brcm,bcm2711-cprman";
46 #clock-cells = <1>;
47 reg = <0x7e101000 0x2000>;
48 clocks = <&clk_osc>, <&dsi0 0>, <&dsi1 0>, ..;
49 firmware = <&firmware>;
50 };
51
52 mailbox: mailbox@7e00b880 {
53 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-mbox";
54 reg = <0x7e00b880 0x40>;
55 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 33 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
56 #mbox-cells = <0>;
57 };
58
59 gpio: gpio@7e200000 {
60 compatible = "brcm,bcm2711-gpio", "brcm,bcm2835-gpio";
61 reg = <0x7e200000 0xb4>;
62 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 113 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, ..;
63 gpio-controller;
64 #gpio-cells = <2>;
65 interrupt-controller;
66 #interrupt-cells = <2>;
67 pinctrl-names = "default";
68
69 emmc_gpio48: emmc_gpio48 {
70 brcm,pins = <48 49 50 51 52 51>;
71 brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
72 };
73
74 sdhost_gpio48: sdhost_gpio48 {
75 brcm,pins = <22 23 24 25 26 27>;
76 brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT0>;
77 };
78
79 i2s_pins: i2s {
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80 brcm,pins = <18 19 20 21>;
81 brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT0>;
82 };
83
84 i2c1_pins: i2c1 {
85 brcm,pins = <2 3>;
86 brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT0>;
87 brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_UP>;
88 };
89
90 sdio_pins: sdio_pins {
91 brcm,pins = <34 35 36 37 38 39>;
92 brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
93 brcm,pull = <0 2 2 2 2 2>;
94 };
95







103 i2s: i2s@7e203000 {
104 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-i2s";
105 reg = <0x7e203000 0x24>;
106 clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_PCM>;
107 dmas = <&dma 2>, <&dma 3>;
108 dma-names = "tx", "rx";
109 status = "disabled";
110 #sound-dai-cells = <0>;
111 pinctrl-names = "default";
112 pinctrl-0 = <&i2s_pins>;
113 };
114
115 i2c1: i2c@7e804000 {
116 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-i2c";
117 reg = <0x7e804000 0x1000>;
118 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 117 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
119 clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
120 #address-cells = <1>;
121 #size-cells = <0>;
122 status = "disabled";
123 pinctrl-names = "default";
124 pinctrl-0 = <&i2c1_pins>;
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125 clock-frequency = <100000>;
126
127 rpi-sense@46 {
128 compatible = "rpi,rpi-sense";
129 reg = <0x46>;
130 keys-int-gpios = <&gpio 23 1>;




135 compatible = "st,lsm9ds1-magn";
136 reg = <0x1c>;




141 compatible = "st,lsm9ds1-accel";
142 reg = <0x6a>;




147 compatible = "st,lps25h-press";
148 reg = <0x5c>;




153 compatible = "st,hts221-humid", "st,hts221";
154 reg = <0x5f>;




159 csi1: csi@7e801000 {
160 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-unicam";
161 reg = <0x7e801000 0x800>,
162 <0x7e802004 0x4>;
163 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 103 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
164 clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_CAM1>;
165 clock-names = "lp";
166 #address-cells = <1>;
167 #size-cells = <0>;
168 #clock-cells = <1>;
169 status = "disabled";
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179 dsi0: dsi@7e209000 {
180 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-dsi0";
181 reg = <0x7e209000 0x78>;
182 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 100 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
183 #address-cells = <1>;
184 #size-cells = <0>;
185 #clock-cells = <1>;
186 clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_PLLA_DSI0>, ..;
187 clock-names = "phy", "escape", "pixel";
188 clock-output-names = "dsi0_byte", ..;
189 power-domains = <&power RPI_POWER_DOMAIN_DSI0>;
190 };
191
192 dsi1: dsi@7e700000 {
193 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-dsi1";
194 reg = <0x7e700000 0x8c>;
195 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 108 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
196 #address-cells = <1>;
197 #size-cells = <0>;
198 #clock-cells = <1>;
199 clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_PLLD_DSI1>, ..;
200 clock-names = "phy", "escape", "pixel";
201 clock-output-names = "dsi1_byte", ..;
202 status = "disabled";




207 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-dpi";
208 reg = <0x7e208000 0x8c>;
209 clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>, ..;
210 clock-names = "core", "pixel";
211 #address-cells = <1>;
212 #size-cells = <0>;




216 aux: aux@7e215000 {
217 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-aux";
218 #clock-cells = <1>;
219 reg = <0x7e215000 0x8>;
220 clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
221 };
222
223 uart1: serial@7e215040 {
224 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-aux-uart";
225 reg = <0x7e215040 0x40>;
226 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 93 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
227 clocks = <&aux BCM2835_AUX_CLOCK_UART>;
228 status = "okay";
229 pinctrl-names = "default";
230 pinctrl-0 = <&uart1_pins>;
231 };
232
233 spi0: spi@7e204000 {
234 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-spi";
235 reg = <0x7e204000 0x200>;
236 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
237 clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
238 dmas = <&dma 6 &dma 7>;
239 dma-names = "tx", "rx";
240 #address-cells = <1>;
241 #size-cells = <0>;
242 status = "disabled";
243 pinctrl-names = "default";
244 pinctrl-0 = <&spi0_pins &spi0_cs_pins>;
245 cs-gpios = <&gpio 8 1>, <&gpio 7 1>;
246
247 spidev@0 {
248 compatible = "spidev";
249 reg = <0x0>;
250 #address-cells = <1>;
251 #size-cells = <0>;




256 compatible = "spidev";
257 reg = <0x1>;
258 #address-cells = <1>;
259 #size-cells = <0>;
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264 gicv2: gic400@40041000 {
265 interrupt-controller;
266 #interrupt-cells = <3>;
267 compatible = "arm,gic-400";




272 interrupts = <GIC_PPI 0 ..>;
273 };
274
275 emmc2: emmc2@7e340000 {
276 compatible = "brcm,bcm2711-emmc2";
277 status = "okay";
278 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 126 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
279 clocks = <&clocks BCM2711_CLOCK_EMMC2>;
280 reg = <0x7e340000 0x100>;
281 broken-cd;
282 vqmmc-supply = <&sd_io_1v8_reg>;
283 vmmc-supply = <&sd_vcc_reg>;
284 };
285
286 mmcnr: mmcnr@7e300000 {
287 compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-mmc", "brcm,bcm2835-sdhci";
288 reg = <0x7e300000 0x100>;
289 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 126 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
290 clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_EMMC>;
291 dmas = <&dma 11>;
292 dma-names = "rx-tx";
293 brcm,overclock-50 = <0>;
294 non-removable;
295 status = "okay";
296 pinctrl-names = "default";
297 pinctrl-0 = <&sdio_pins>;
298 bus-width = <4>;
299 };
300
301 firmware: firmware {
302 compatible = "raspberrypi,bcm2835-firmware", ..;
303 mboxes = <&mailbox>;
304
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305 expgpio: gpio {
306 compatible = "raspberrypi,firmware-gpio";
307 gpio-controller;
308 #gpio-cells = <2>;
309 gpio-line-names = "BT_ON", "WL_ON", ..;




314 power: power {
315 compatible = "raspberrypi,bcm2835-power";
316 firmware = <&firmware>;







324 compatible = "gpio-leds";
325
326 act_led: act {
327 label = "led0";
328 default-state = "keep";
329 linux,default-trigger = "mmc0";
330 gpios = <&gpio 42 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
331 };
332
333 pwr_led: pwr {
334 label = "led1";
335 linux,default-trigger = "default-on";





341 compatible = "simple-bus";
342 #address-cells = <1>;
343 #size-cells = <0>;
344
345 clk_osc: clock@3 {
346 compatible = "fixed-clock";
347 reg = <0x3>;
348 #clock-cells = <0>;
349 clock-output-names = "osc";
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355 compatible = "arm,cortex-a72-pmu", "arm,cortex-a15-pmu";
356 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 16 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, ..;




361 compatible = "arm,armv7-timer";






368 #address-cells = <1>;
369 #size-cells = <0>;
370 enable-method = "brcm,bcm2836-smp";
371
372 cpu0: cpu@0 {
373 device_type = "cpu";
374 compatible = "arm,cortex-a72";
375 reg = <0x0>;
376 enable-method = "spin-table";






383 scb: scb {
384 compatible = "simple-bus";
385 #address-cells = <2>;
386 #size-cells = <1>;
387 ranges = <0x0 0x7c000000 0x0 0xfc000000 0x03800000>,
388 <0x0 0x40000000 0x0 0xff800000 0x00800000>,
389 <0x6 0x00000000 0x6 0x00000000 0x40000000>,
390 <0x0 0x00000000 0x0 0x00000000 0xfc000000>;
391 dma-ranges = <0x0 0x0 0x0 0x0 0xfc000000>;
392
393 pcie_0: pcie@7d500000 {
394 reg = <0x0 0x7d500000 0x9310>,
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395 <0x0 0x7e00f300 0x20>;
396 msi-controller;
397 msi-parent = <&pcie_0>;
398 #address-cells = <3>;
399 #interrupt-cells = <1>;
400 #size-cells = <2>;
401 bus-range = <0x0 0x1>;
402 compatible = "brcm,bcm2711b0-pcie", ..;
403 max-link-speed = <2>;
404 tot-num-pcie = <1>;
405 linux,pci-domain = <0>;
406 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 148 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, ..;
407 interrupt-names = "pcie", "msi";
408 interrupt-map-mask = <0x0 0x0 0x0 0x7>;
409 interrupt-map = <0 0 0 1 &gicv2 GIC_SPI 143 ..>,
410 <0 0 0 2 &gicv2 GIC_SPI 144 ..>,
411 <0 0 0 3 &gicv2 GIC_SPI 145 ..>,
412 <0 0 0 4 &gicv2 GIC_SPI 146 ..>;





418 genet: genet@7d580000 {
419 compatible = "brcm,genet-v5";
420 reg = <0x0 0x7d580000 0x10000>;
421 status = "okay";
422 #address-cells = <1>;
423 #size-cells = <1>;
424 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 157 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, ..;
425 phy-handle = <&phy1>;
426 phy-mode = "rgmii";
427
428 mdio@e14 {
429 #address-cells = <0>;
430 #size-cells = <1>;
431 compatible = "brcm,genet-mdio-v5";
432 reg = <0xe14 0x8>;
433 reg-names = "mdio";
434
435 phy1: genet-phy@0 {
436 compatible = "ethernet-phy-ieee802.3-c22";
437 max-speed = <1000>;
438 reg = <0x1>;










448 compatible = "simple-bus";
449 #address-cells = <1>;
450 #size-cells = <1>;
451 ranges = <0x7c500000 0x0 0xfc500000 0x03300000>,
452 <0x40000000 0x0 0xff800000 0x00800000>;
453 dma-ranges = <0x00000000 0x0 0x00000000 0x3c000000>;
454
455 v3d@7ec04000 {
456 compatible = "brcm,2711-v3d";
457 reg = <0x7ec00000 0x4000>, ..;
458 reg-names = "hub", "core0";
459 power-domains = <&pm BCM2835_POWER_DOMAIN_GRAFX_V3D>;
460 resets = <&pm BCM2835_RESET_V3D>;
461 clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_V3D>;
462 interrupts = <GIC_SPI 74 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;




467 vdd_5v0_reg: fixedregulator_5v0 {
468 compatible = "regulator-fixed";
469 regulator-name = "5v0";
470 regulator-min-microvolt = <5000000>;




475 sd_io_1v8_reg: sd_io_1v8_reg {
476 status = "okay";
477 compatible = "regulator-gpio";
478 vin-supply = <&vdd_5v0_reg>;
479 regulator-name = "vdd-sd-io";
480 regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
481 regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
482 regulator-boot-on;
483 regulator-always-on;
484 regulator-settling-time-us = <5000>;
71
485 gpios = <&expgpio 4 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
486 states = <1800000 0x1 3300000 0x0>;
487 };
488
489 sd_vcc_reg: sd_vcc_reg {
490 compatible = "regulator-fixed";
491 regulator-name = "vcc-sd";
492 regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
493 regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
494 regulator-boot-on;
495 enable-active-high;





Figure A.1: Device tree source code of the Raspberry Pi 4 in standard configura-
tion, with an attached Sense Hat board. The device tree has been aggregated from
the different source files and pruned and edited for brevity. The source code is
taken from the latest stable Raspbian Linux kernel version 4.19 [14], commit hash
a75a01501330a9be188561b0e9da1da6da372eea (while writing this thesis the
device tree changed on several occasions).
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